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ABSTRACT 
This paper compares how effective different voting algorithms are for the decisions taken 
by monetary policy councils. A voting activity index is proposed and computed as the ratio 
of the number of all possible decisions to the total number of different combinations of 
decisions available to a given composition of an MPC. The voting systems considered are 
these used by the US Federal Reserve Board and the central banks of the UK, Australia, 
Canada, Sweden and Poland. In the dynamic simulation model, which emulates voting 
decisions, the heterogeneous agents act upon individual forecast signals and optimise a 
Taylor-like decision function. The selection criterion is based on the simulated probability 
of staying within the bounds that define the inflationary target. The general conclusion is 
that the voting algorithm used by the Bank of Sweden is the best given the criteria applied, 
especially when inflation is initially outside the target bounds. It is observed that a decrease 
in inflation forecast uncertainty, which is inversely proportional to the correlation between 
the forecast signals delivered to members of the monetary policy board, makes the voting 
less effective. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Most independent central banks decide on their monetary policy by voting within a decision 
body usually called the monetary policy council (or board, or board of governors, or something 
similar), abbreviated here as MPC. The theory and practice of voting as applied in central banks 
has been a focus of research for some time. The recent literature concentrates particularly on 
the predictive power of voting records (see Horváth and Jonášová, 2015), voting transparency 
(Gersbach and Hahn, 2009), the efficiency and consistency of voting schemes (Gersbach and 
Pahl, 2009; Sosnowska, 2013), the predictability of voting results (Sirchenko, 2011; Ribon, and 
Ruge-Murcia, 2014; Horváth, Šmídková and Zápal 2016) and other such topics.  
This paper focuses on the rather narrow, and apparently unresearched, topic of the volatility of 
the voting algorithms applied by different central banks. It is well known that overactive 
monetary policy might well result in destabilisation (e.g. Akram, Bärsden, and Eithreim, 2006; 
Charemza and Ladley, 2016), while a constantly passive policy might be no policy at all. It 
should be stressed that this paper is not about the timing of monetary decisions like Olivei and 
Teeyro (2007) and Choi, Eisenbach, and Yorulmazer (2016) are. Rather it considers cases 
where different central banks given the same set of extraneous information might take different 
decisions solely because of differences in the voting schemes they use. More precisely, it 
analyses two interrelated problems: (i) how different voting algorithms, like those used in six 
independent central banks, affect how often active decisions are taken, and (ii) how effective 
these algorithms are in voting that is aimed at keeping inflation within target bands. Problem 
(i) is analysed in Section 2, which describes particular voting algorithms and presents the voting 
activity index for particular algorithms. Section 3 is devoted to problem (ii) and describes the 
settings of the simulation model that is used and presents the results under the assumption of 
purely random forecast signals delivered to voters. Section 4 concludes and discusses possible 
developments of the technique proposed. 
2. THE CONTESTANTS: MPC VOTING ALGORITHMS AND VOTING ACTIVITY 
It is assumed that there are n members of an MPC voting at regular intervals at time t. All voters 
are sincere in the sense that their decisions are based solely on the outcome of their individual 
decision functions (see, e.g. Dietrich and List, 2004). The MPC voting always results in a 
decision t =  -1, 0 or 1, where -1 stands for a pro-inflationary measure such as a cut in the 
interest rate, 1 is an anti-inflationary measure like a rise in the interest rate, and 0 means the 
status quo is maintained. To define the particular voting schemes, the following notation is 
used. 
Let 
,i tv  denote the voting decision of the ith MPC member, i=1,2,…,n, at time t, t=1,2,…,T,  to 
vote for the outcome 1, 0,1k = − . ( )kitI  is its indicator function so that ( ), 1ki tI =  if ,i tv k= , and 0 
otherwise. Further on, let us identify the indicator function of the MPC member with the casting 
vote as ( )
,
k
c tI  and denote the random variables that aggregate or count the votes as 
( ) ( )
,
1
n
k k
t i t
i
I I
=
=
. The particular voting mechanisms that can result in a decision t  are:  
1. The Federal Reserve Board (FED) voting scheme. In the FED scheme, one member of MPC 
is the Chair, who proposes a motion that is either supported by the majority, including the 
Chair, or is not. If the Chair proposes to maintain the status quo, so 0t = , it is uncontested. 
The voting decision is then: 
 
( ) ( )
,
{ : max( )}k kt t c tk I I =     . 
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In this scheme, the number of voters, n, is equal to 12 for five Governors and seven 
nominated members. 
2. The Bank of England (BoE) voting scheme (n=9). The decision is equal to the median vote 
when the number of votes is odd, and to 0 if it is even, that is: 
( ) ( ) ( ): ( 1)nt t t t
k k k
k I I n I  
    =
  = + = −  −       . 
3. The Bank of Sweden (BoS) voting scheme (n=6). This is a three-way majority voting system 
voting, where the decision is taken by the majority of votes as -1, 0 and 1, with the Chair 
having a casting vote if there is a tie. The decision is defined as: 
' ( ){ : max( )}kt tk I =  and 't t =   if 't  is a one-element set, meaning there is no tie, or: 
'
,
{ : 1; }t c t tI  = =   if | | 1 =  and 0t =  otherwise. 
4. The Bank of Canada (BoC) voting scheme (n=6). This is a three-way majority voting 
scheme, but without a casting vote. If there is a tie, 0t = . 
5. The Bank of Australia (BoA) voting scheme. The voting scheme is as in BoC, but n=9. 
6. The Bank of Poland (BoP) voting scheme (n=10). This is an absolute majority voting scheme 
such that the voters first vote for the 1t =  motion. If there is no absolute majority, or if 
there is a tie and the motion is not supported by the Governor, there is another vote for the 
1t = −  motion. If the voting is not decisive, 0t = . Hence: ' ( ){ : max[( / ) 0.5]}kt tk I n = −  
if ( )( / ) 0.5ktI n   and ' 0t =  otherwise. If 't  is a one-element set, meaning no tie, then 
'
t t =  ; otherwise ',{ : 1; }t c t tI  = =   if | | 1 =  and 0t =  if 0 = . 
These voting algorithms are somewhat stylised and might not fully reflect the reality of voting. 
Firstly, it is difficult to find clear information on the scheme of how votes in individual central 
banks are aggregated. The settings given above are based on fragmentary information from the 
minutes and other documents of various central banks, and in some cases on private 
information. Secondly, some banks are quite liberal in applying the voting rules. There is some 
anecdotal evidence of voting on more than one motion simultaneously and of exceptional voting 
rules being applied. Consequently, the algorithms above should be treated as a somewhat 
arbitrary stylisation of the real voting processes.  
It might be that all the six schemes described above result in different decisions being taken for 
the same set of extraneous information delivered to the voters. It is possible to evaluate how far 
each scheme tends to take active decisions, that is such that | | 1t = , by computing the voting 
activity index (VAI) by dividing the number of all possible active decisions by the total number 
of different combinations of decisions available to a given composition of each MPC. The 
complication for the FED, BoS and BoP voting schemes is that assigning a casting vote to 
different MPC members affects the outcome as the caster might or might not influence the 
outcome, depending on the initial voting results and their own preferences. This is dealt with in 
computing the VAIs by assigning the casting vote to each MPC member in turn and averaging 
the results. Table 1 contains the computation results, with standard errors resulting from 
averaging the results for different casters in parentheses. It should be noted that the VAI does 
not depend on the way the individual voting decisions 
,i tv  are formed. The decision-making 
from voting is described later, in Section 4.  
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Table 1 indicates substantial differences between the voting activity patterns in different voting 
schemes. Not surprisingly, the most active scheme is the one with the smallest number of MPC 
members and with a casting voter, which is BoS, and the least active scheme is that with the 
largest number of voters, which is FED. Comparing BoS and BoC shows that having a caster 
increases the degree of voting activity by 15% on average. Of the two schemes that have the 
same number of voters and no caster, the BoE and BoA schemes, the three-way majority voting 
is more active than the median voter scheme. The relative influence of the caster on the 
outcome, measured by the standard deviation of VAI, is by far the highest for FED, where the 
results can vary by nearly 16% on average, depending on who is carrying the casting vote. 
Table 1: Average voting activity index (VAI) 
 FED BoE BoS BoC BoA BoP 
n 12 9 6 6 9 10 
No. comb. 91 55 28 28 55 66 
Av. VAI 0.474 
(0.157) 
0.546 
(0) 
0.768 
(0.038) 
0.571 
(0) 
0.618 
(0) 
0.538 
(0.060) 
 
To assess the interdependence of the voting schemes, simple Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficients have been computed for the paired outcomes of all the voting algorithms. A 
complication arises though because there is a different number of all possible outcomes when 
there is a different number of voters, and that makes direct pairwise comparison impossible. 
Consequently, we have computed the correlation coefficients for an equal number of voters 
assuming for each pair of algorithms, say x,y, that the number of voters is equal first to that of 
x, and then to that of y. Table 2 presents these coefficients. The upper triangle shows the rank 
coefficients when the number of voters is that given in the second row of the table and the lower 
triangle for the number of voters given in the second column. Standard deviations resulting 
from assigning the casting vote to different voters are given in parentheses. 
In Table 2, standard errors equal to zero appear when neither of the pair of algorithms compared 
has a caster or if the voting outcomes of both methods are identical and the correlation between 
the results is perfect. It is interesting to note that this happened to the BoE and BoP algorithms 
for n=10, so if Bank of England had 10 voters rather than nine, but not in the reverse situation 
if the Bank of Poland had nine voters rather than 10.  
Table 2: Rank correlation coefficients for outcomes of different voting algorithms 
 
n 
FED BoE BoS BoC BoA BoP 
12 9 6 6 9 10 
FED 12 
 0.563 
(0.244) 
0.599 
(0.208) 
0.548 
(0.226) 
0.548 
(0.226) 
0.658 
(0.210) 
BoE 9 
0.592 
(0.266) 
 0.740 
(0.017) 
0.753 
(0) 
0.753 
(0) 
1.000 
(0) 
BoS 6 
0.616 
(0.145) 
0.675 
(0.044) 
 0.732 
(0.099) 
0.732 
(0.099) 
0.715 
(0.081) 
BoC 6 
0.523 
(0.127) 
0.819 
(0) 
0.732 
(0.010) 
 1.000 
(0) 
0.758 
(0.098) 
BoA 9 
0.513 
(0.240) 
0.753 
(0) 
0.882 
(0.0101) 
1.000 
(0) 
 0.789 
(0) 
BoP 10 
0.635 
(0.284) 
0.812 
(0.062) 
0.776 
(0.043) 
0.830 
(0.039) 
0.830 
(0.039) 
 
 
The correlation coefficients are slightly higher for the pairs of algorithms compared where the 
number of voters is lower. The correlation of the outcomes of the FED algorithm with the others 
is generally lower than the correlation of outcomes for the other algorithms.  
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Without further assumptions, it is not possible to decide whether the committees with more or 
fewer voters and more or less voting activity are better. That depends on the competence of the 
voters and the signals they receive. So in order to decide which voting algorithm leads to more 
accurate decisions, other things being equal, it is necessary to design a model that explains the 
mechanism of the decisions taken by individual committee members. Such a model is given in 
Section 3.  
3. HETEROGENEOUS VOTING MODEL AND FORECAST UNCERTAINTY 
The voting decisions 
,i tv  in the schemes given in Section 2 are the outcomes of the decision-
making process of the voters. The model describing these decisions is a modified version of 
that developed by Charemza and Ladley (2016). It is assumed that n voting members of the 
MPC vote in each period t = 0, 1, 2,…, T. The decision function for the ith MPC member, 
1 i n  , is derived as a solution of a simple optimisation problem of a Taylor-like decision 
function (see Geraats, 2009): 
, 1[ (1 )]fi i t i iz    += + −   ,        (1) 
where 
, 1
f
i t +  denotes the level of inflation that the ith MPC member expects in time t for time 
t+1,   is a real sphere weight, and ωi is the weight representing the individual tendency of the 
voter to favour active voting, so the higher ωi is, the more the ith MPC member favours active 
decisions relative to the other members. The following rule describes voting decisions:  
,
, ,
1 if
0 if
1 if
i i t
i t i i t i
i i
s z
v s z s
s z
+
− +
−
 =  − 
    ,       (2) 
where is −  and is +  are the lower and upper thresholds set a priori and assumed to be constant in 
time.  
The expectations in the forecasts developed by the MPC members are interdependent in the 
sense that the vector 1, 1 2, 1 , 1[ , ,..., ]'f f ft t n t  + + +  is generated from a multivariate normal distribution 
with identical covariances and variances equal to the variance of 1t + , which is inflation in time 
t+1 and is assumed to be a random variable. In such a setting, all the bivariate correlation 
coefficients are identical and are equal to r. Consequently, an increase in r means that the 
dispersion between the forecasts delivered to individual voters decreases. The concept of 
uncertainty by disagreement, proposed by Bomberger (1996) and developed further, by 
Giordani and Söderlind (2003), Lahiri and Sheng (2010), and Clements (2014) in particular, 
and in the context of its effect on monetary policy decisions by Charemza, Díaz and Makarova 
(2019), states that the dispersion of individual forecasts is a measure of uncertainty. As an 
increase in r indicates a reduction in forecast uncertainty, uncertainty can be controlled for by 
manipulating r. 
It is assumed that initially 0 0~ ( ,1)eN   and it is further assumed that the only factor changing 
the distribution of inflation in times 0t   is the MPC decision. More precisely:  
 1 0
1
t
t j
j
  +
=
−      , for 0t         (3) 
where  denotes equality in distribution, t =  -1, 0 or 1 depending on the final voting decision 
of the MPC (see Section 2), and   is the decision strength, which is assumed to be constant 
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over time. Depending on the outcome of earlier voting, the distribution of 1t +  might be non-
normal and skewed.  
It is convenient to interpret s −  and s +  as the lower and upper bounds for the inflation target, 
especially if the bounds are around zero, meaning the point inflation target 0T = , and 
0.4307s− = − , 0.4307s+ = . The initial distribution of inflation is standard normal, so for 
0 0
e = , this gives the probability of 0.333 of inflation being within the bounds at time 0. 
Further assumptions used in the simulations are:  
  (i): /i i n =  ;  (ii): 0.25 =  ; (iii) 0.25 = . 
If there is no active decision about inflation in the model described above, so 0t =  
throughout, the distribution of inflation remains unchanged over time for each t and each voting 
algorithm and is equal to 0 . Only active voting causes inflation distribution to change. Hence 
in period t=1,2,…,T, each of n MPC members: 
• computes (1), that is, solves the Taylor-like optimisation problem as described in 
Geraats (2009);  
• makes a voting decision (2) based on the signal received for expected inflation;  
• votes using one of the voting algorithms described in Section 2.  
In period t+1 the distribution of inflation is decided by (3). In all settings 
, 1
f
i t +  are drawings 
from the inflation distribution in period t+1 that are mutually dependent with the correlation 
coefficient r, but independent of t, and are made under the assumption that the MPC decision 
would be passive. This is then the same as the distribution of inflation in time t. Rationally, if 
inflation in period t+1 is to be within the bounds of the inflation target, the best move would be 
to vote for no action and, if inflation in time t+1 is to be outside the bounds, an appropriate 
active decision will direct it towards the bounds. This is the essence of the aggregate measure 
of success in the voting contest used here, the ratio of deviations from target denoted as RDT, 
which was introduced by Charemza and Ladley (2016). It is computed as: 
Pr( )1
Pr( )t t
s z sRDT
s s
− +
− +
 = −  
  
,
 
where ~ (0,1)z N
.
 Recalling that 0 0~ ( ,1)eN  , and s−and s+  are the lower and upper limits 
of the target bounds, z is a hypothetical inflation distribution with dispersion that is never 
affected by voting and with the mean of the distribution in the middle of the inflation target. 
The distribution of t  might be non-trivial if any active voting took place in the past. 
Consequently, Pr( )ts s− +   is approximated by running 250,000 replications of the voting 
process for each period t = 1, 2,...,T, and computing the frequency of cases where the inflation 
observation was within the inflation target. Clearly, a smaller RDTt means the probability of 
inflation being around the inflationary target is higher.  
In order to account for different initial conditions, the mean of the initial inflation distribution 
changes from 0 1
e = −
 to 0 1
e =
 with a step of 0.05. In the current setting, the planning horizon 
is equal to T=5, and the degree of correlation between the forecasting signals varies as r=0.1, 
0.5 and 0.95, which correspond to a high, moderate and low degree of forecast uncertainty. 
Figures 1a-e give the pairwise comparisons of the RDTt s for the Bank of Poland with those of 
the other five central banks. Results for high uncertainty, represented by r, are in the upper 
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panels, for moderate uncertainty in the middle panels and for low in the bottom panels. The 
plots show a similar pattern of the evolution of the RDTt s with the changes in the distance of 
inflation from its target for all the banks. The U-shape of the curves indicates that as this 
distance increases, the voting algorithms become less efficient at bringing inflation back to the 
target bands. The FED algorithm is slightly more efficient than that of the Bank of Poland at 
keeping inflation in time within the target band of ±0.4307 if 0
e
 was already within this band 
or close to it. However, as the distance of 0
e
 from zero increases, the advantage of the voting 
algorithm of the Bank of Poland becomes evident. This advantage decreases as forecast 
uncertainty decreases as r increases. When uncertainty is low, the FED algorithm dominates 
that of the Bank of Poland for nearly all values of 0
e
 except the most extreme ones. 
There is some asymmetry in the RDTs for the Bank of Poland for the positive and negative 0
e
 
with the same module. Figure 1b shows that this asymmetry is much greater for the Bank of 
England, for which the minimum point of the RDT is not very close to 0 0e = ; it is to the right 
of it, with a tendency to drift to the right as uncertainty decreases. For 0 0e  and for cases 
where the negative expected value of initial inflation is moderate, the voting algorithm of the 
Bank of England is more effective at keeping inflation within the target bands than that of the 
Bank of Poland. For the more extreme cases of negative 0e , the voting algorithm of the Bank 
of Poland outperforms that of the Bank of England. 
The voting algorithm of the Bank of Sweden (Figure 1c) is generally more effective than that 
of the Bank of Poland. The exception comes when uncertainty is high and 0e  is close to zero. 
The Bank of Canada algorithm (Figure 1d) is also more effective than that of the Bank of Poland 
for moderate and low uncertainty if 0e  is close to zero, meaning it is within the target bands. 
This result is similar to that for FED shown in Figure 1a. The result for the Bank of Australia 
(Figure 1e) is again asymmetric and is similar to that for the Bank of England.  
Figure 2 presents a comparison of the RDTs for the Bank of Poland (Figure 2a) and FED (Figure 
2b) for the different forecast uncertainty, represented by different r’s. The pattern for the Bank 
of Poland is similar to those of the Banks of England, Sweden, Canada and Australia, which 
are not reported here. As forecast uncertainty increases, the voting algorithms become more 
effective. It should be noted that in the schemes (1)-(3), where the forecasts are drawn randomly 
from a distribution with constant dispersion, a more certain forecast with a large r might be just 
as wrong or right as a less certain forecast. Consequently, when there is little forecast 
uncertainty, and individual forecasts are relatively close to each other, voting algorithms are 
more likely to produce a wrong and hence ineffective decision. However, this is slightly 
different for FED. For a negative or slightly positive 0e , the pattern is the same as for the other 
algorithms. For markedly positive values of 0e , there are practically no differences between 
the RDTs for the different levels of uncertainty. 
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Figure 1a: Comparison of RDT’s, Bank of Poland and FED 
 
 
  
8 
Figure 1b: Comparison of RDT’s, Bank of Poland and Bank of England 
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Figure 1c: Comparison of RDT’s, Bank of Poland and Bank of Sweden 
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Figure 1d: Comparison of RDT’s, Bank of Poland and Bank of Canada 
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Figure 1e: Comparison of RDT’s, Bank of Poland and Bank of Australia 
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Figure 2a: Comparison of RDT’s for different forecast uncertainty, Bank of Poland  
 
Figure 2b: Comparison of RDT’s for different forecast uncertainty, FED  
 
Figures 1 and 2 suggest a simple aggregate measure for comparing the efficiency of voting 
algorithms. Clearly, the most efficient algorithm on aggregate in the region 0
e 
 is the one 
for which the area below the RDTt curve is the smallest in this region. Numbering the algorithms 
as j=1,2,..,6, and denoting 0( )j j et tRDT f =  for the continuous case, the best algorithm is the 
one where:  
 
0
0 0: ( ) min
e
j e e
tj f d

 

=    . 
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As the measurements of 0
e
 are taken at identical intervals that are the same for all the 
algorithms, the integral above is proportional to the sum of the tRDT s for 0
e  . For 
comparison we consider three subsets here: (1) 0| | [ 0.4307,0.4307 ]e  − , so it is within the 
target area; (2) 0| | [0.4307 ,1]e  , which is where the initial inflation is outside the target area; 
and (3) 0 [ 1,1]e  − , where the entire set of 0e ’s is under consideration. Table 3 presents these 
sums for all the algorithms compared and for the different r’s.   
Table 3: Sums of the RDTs for the six voting algorithms 
 r=0.05 r=0.50 r=0.95 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
FED 36.21 201.9 238.1 47.44 208.9 256.4 63.50 219.5 283.0 
BoE 32.74 172.1 204.8 48.35 190.6 238.9 68.13 222.0 290.2 
BoS 42.10 139.6 181.7 57.67 183.9 241.5 70.34 217.4 287.7 
BoC 42.47 181.5 224.0 52.87 210.0 262.9 64.89 228.9 293.8 
BoA 36.82 160.4 197.2 49.26 190.4 239.6 68.13 222.0 290.2 
BoP 40.23 165.6 205.8 62.38 195.4 257.8 78.89 224.6 303.5 
 
Table 3 does not give an immediate and clear indication of the winner of the contest. Hence it 
seems convenient to summarise the results in another table showing the winners, with the 
smallest sum of RDTt, and the losers, with the largest sum of RDTt, for (1) the entire range of 
initial inflation, or 0 [ 1,1]e  − ; (2) initial inflation being within the target bounds; and (3) initial 
inflation being outside the target bounds. The results are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Winners and losers of the voting contest 
 entire range 
0
e
 within target bounds 0
e
 outside target bounds 
 high 
uncertainty 
low 
uncertainty 
high 
uncertainty 
low 
uncertainty 
high 
uncertainty 
low 
uncertainty 
winners BoS FED BoE BoC BoS BoS 
losers FED BoP BoS BoP FED BoP 
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4. CONCLUSIONS: AND THE WINNER IS …. 
The results given in Section 3 show that the voting algorithm of the Bank of Poland does not 
do very well against the criterion of being effective at keeping inflation within the target bands. 
It is particularly ineffective when forecast uncertainty is low, meaning when the forecast signals 
delivered to the individual voters are highly correlated. The overall winner is the voting 
algorithm of the Bank of Sweden, which uses three-way majority voting with six voters and a 
caster. It beats all the other algorithms in the most important case, which is where the initial 
expected value of inflation is outside the target bounds so that an active decision is needed to 
bring it back within those bounds. The results shown in Section 2 indicate that it is also the 
algorithm that, on average, gives active voting outcomes most frequently. However, it is less 
effective if the initial inflation is close to the target as it lies within the target bounds. This 
algorithm is also robust to changes in forecast uncertainty, as it is a winner both when 
uncertainty is high and when it is low. The algorithm with the most extreme results is that of 
the FED, which does well with low uncertainty, but fails when the uncertainty is high. 
Caution is needed in interpreting these results. Firstly, just because the stylised Bank of Sweden 
algorithm performs better than the others at keeping inflation within the target in the simulation 
experiment described here does not mean that the Swedish monetary policy is superior. 
Conclusions should be strictly limited to the algorithms alone and not to the actual policies 
conducted. Secondly, although the experiment is numerically tedious and virtually impossible 
to conduct without a high-powered parallel computer, it is still limited in its scope. Only the 
extreme case of purely random forecasts has been described here. Further studies are needed 
for intermediate cases, where there is a certain degree of correlation between the forecasts and 
the outcomes. This is left for further investigation.  
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